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1 University of Lille, France
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ABSTRACT
While the problem of greedy behavior at the MAC layer has been widely explored in the context of wireless local area
networks (WLAN), its study for multi-hop wireless networks still almost an unexplored and unexplained problem. Indeed,
in a wireless local area network, an access point mostly forwards packets sent by wireless nodes over the wired link. In this
case, a greedy node can easily get more bandwidth share and starve all other associated contending nodes by manipulating
intelligently MAC layer parameters. However, in wireless ad hoc environment, all packets are transmitted in a multi-hop
fashion over wireless links. In this case, an attempting greedy node, if it behaves similarly as in a WLAN, trying to starve
all its neighbors, then its next hop forwarder will be also prevented from forwarding its own trafﬁc, which leads obviously
to an end to end throughput collapse. In this paper, we show that in order to have a more beneﬁcial greedy behavior in
wireless ad hoc network, a node must adopt a different approach than in WLAN to achieve a better performance of its own
ﬂows. Then, we present a new strategy to launch such a greedy attack in a proactive routing based wireless ad hoc network.
A detailed description of the proposed strategy is provided along with its validation through extensive simulations. The
obtained results show that a greedy node, applying the deﬁned strategy, can gain more bandwidth than its neighbors and
keep the end-to-end throughput of its own ﬂows highly reasonable. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The increase in computation power, the compactness of size,
incorporation of mobility and ease of connectivity from
anywhere are amongst the major factors that resulted in
tremendous growth of handheld devices in recent years.
From cordless phones to cellular networks and from WiFi
to sensors, the wireless medium has become the preferred backbone of today’s deployed networks. The newest
model being introduced is the Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs), in which mobile nodes, within the transmission range of each others, can communicate directly
over the wireless link, while those that are far apart use
other nodes as relays. The properties of MANETs, such
as shared wireless medium, open network architecture,
stringent resource constraints and rapidly changing topology make this type of network vulnerable to a bunch of
attacks at different layers, especially at MAC layer in which
attacks are launched easily. Therefore, the task of secur284

ing such network remains hard and necessitates careful
investigation.
Since IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, as described in Reference [1], is commonly used by wireless nodes to access the
medium, any misbehavior at this level may affect the proper
functioning of the network. The serious damage caused by
MAC layer misbehavior has received considerable research
attention leading to an in depth investigation and analysis of
its root causes, such as the works done in References [2--4].
As a result of this investigation, some pioneering contributions have been proposed in the literature to cope with this
problem such as References [5--7]. These works have identiﬁed several types of MAC layer misbehavior and proposed
countermeasures to detect or prevent such misuse. However,
their solutions are based on the assumption that the greedy
node behaves similarly in MANETs as in wireless local area
networks (WLAN). This assumption is neither realistic nor
sustainable since the greedy node in MANETs, behaving
exactly as in WLAN, will obviously not get much more
Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

S. Djahel, F. Naı̈t-abdesselam and D. Turgut

Characterizing the greedy behavior in wireless ad hoc networks

advantages. Moreover, it may even disrupt the performance
of its own trafﬁc as it will be shown throughout this paper.
Therefore, the existing solutions fail totally in responding
to the concern of greedy behaviors in MANETs.
In this paper, we show that in order to have a more beneﬁcial greedy behavior in wireless ad hoc network, a node must
adopt a different approach than in WLAN. This approach
allows it to achieve better performance for its own trafﬁc
ﬂow as well as for the crossing ﬂows of interest. Then, we
present a novel strategy to launch such a rational greedy
attack in a proactive routing based wireless ad hoc network. A detailed description of the proposed strategy is
provided along with its validation through extensive simulations. The obtained results show that a greedy node,
applying our devised strategy, can gain more bandwidth
than its neighbors and keep the end-to-end throughput and
delay of its own ﬂows highly reasonable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section gives an overview on MAC layer vulnerabilities and
provides a classiﬁcation of greedy node’s behaviors. Thereafter, we give a brief overview on the literature followed by
an in depth comparison between greedy behavior in WLAN
and MANETs in Section 4. Our proposed greedy strategy in MANETs along with the assessment of the energy
consumption induced are presented in Section 5 and 6,
respectively. In Section 7, we report and discuss the obtained
simulation results. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.

2. OVERVIEW OF MAC LAYER
VULNERABILITIES
As it is well known, two medium access techniques exist
in IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, Point Coordination Function (PCF) and Distributed Coordination Function (DCF).
While PCF is reserved for infrastructure based wireless networks (WLAN), the DCF technique can be used in both
modes WLAN and infrastructure-less based wireless networks such as MANETs, Mesh networks and vehicle to
vehicle networks. Therefore, we discuss in the sequel the
potential vulnerabilities of the DCF mode.
A misbehaving node may disobey the MAC protocol
rules to gain more bandwidth over regularly behaving honest nodes. To do so, it should change the MAC layer
parameters. A node can modify the MAC parameters conﬁguration only if the network access card runs the WIFI
protocol on software. In this case, the misbehaving node can
easily implement the following misbehavior techniques:

 Selects its backoff values from different distributions,
for example the backoff period is randomly picked out
from the interval [0, k × CWmin] where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
Note that if k = 1 then the cheater behaves correctly;
however, it doesn’t double its CW after a collision is
occurred. Moreover, it can use different retransmission
strategies upon experiencing an unsuccessful transmission.
 Jams the CTS or ACK frames of its neighbors in order
to increase their contention windows.
Security Comm. Networks 2011; 4:284–298 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec

Figure 1. Classiﬁcation of the greedy nodes’s behaviors.

 When the channel is sensed to be idle, it transmits
before the required DIFS time slots elapses, i.e., the
misbehaving node waits for a shorter period called
S-DIFS (Short-DIFS). This misbehavior technique is
signiﬁcant only if the cheater node’s backoff was
already elapsed before it defers its transmission or if it
sets its backoff value to zero.
 Amplify the value of the duration ﬁeld in RTS or DATA
packets such that the receivers keep silence for a period
larger than the real transmission time. Consequently,
if the cheater node has more packets to send, it gets
more chance to access the medium as it starts counting
down its backoff before its neighbors.

Greedy nodes’ classification
The misbehaving nodes applying the above strategies can
be classiﬁed according to the adopted strategy to launch
the attack and the extent of the induced harm. Hence, the
following classes of greedy nodes can be identiﬁed (see
Figure 1):

 Indirect greedy node: it aims to increase its bandwidth
by launching a cross-layer attack targeting the routing
protocols in order to decrease the number of contending nodes around it, and then increases its chance to
frequently access the medium. To this end, it may
either increase its SIFS value to cause RTS timeout
at the sender node or deny response to the received
RTS frames.
 Direct greedy node: it manipulates the medium
access parameters such as backoff, DIFS or jams the
CTS/ACK packets of its neighbors. This class can be
further divided into three sub-classes as follows:
• Malicious greedy node: which aims to disrupt the
ongoing communications in its neighborhood and
cause damage to the network performance without seeking for any beneﬁts. It can even send fake
data packets to monopolize the medium, under the
assumption that it is equipped with a permanent
energy supply.
• Rational and selﬁsh (uncooperative) greedy
node: the greedy node here wants to increase the
throughput for its own trafﬁc ﬂow and decrease
285
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its end-to-end delay. However, it affects the performance of the crossing ﬂow by delaying it and
releasing the medium for the next hop of its ﬂow to
forward the transmitted packets.
• Rational and cooperative greedy node: in this
case, the greedy node’s behavior is similar to the
previous category; however, it chooses some crossing ﬂows which are of direct interest or conveying
critical information in order to favor them during
forwarding. The following situations justify this
behavior of the greedy node.
– In a battleﬁeld the orders issued from the group
leader are critical and need to be prioritized than
the other ﬂows.
– In an emergency area, the packets sent by the rescuers which are inside the area of incident are
critical and should be given high level of importance by the forwarder node.

3. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO
PREVENT/DETECT MAC LAYER
MISBEHAVIOR
In the last few years, several counter-measures have been
proposed to protect the network against MAC layer misbehavior in both WLAN and MANETs environments. In the
former environment, the majority of the proposed solutions
takes advantage of the trustworthiness property of the access
point and designs centralized schemes based on this property. In the latter environment, the aforementioned property
is no longer valid that’s why the researchers propose distributed solutions rather than centralized. Those solutions
are either deﬁning new MAC protocols completely different
from the standard IEEE 802.11 or maintaining the DCF protocol unchanged and add new components to monitor the
surrounding nodes and collect statistics about their behaviors or just adjust their own DCF parameters according to a
speciﬁc game.
3.1. WLAN environment
The authors of Reference [7] have presented a modular
system, dubbed DOMINO, which does not require any
modiﬁcation to the standard MAC protocol. This system
is implemented at the access point (AP) which is assumed
to be trustworthy. It consists of a set of components ensuring
complementary tasks. The ﬁrst task is to monitor the behavior of wireless nodes around the AP for a certain period of
time in order to collect trafﬁc traces of each node. As a second task, these traces are passed through a set of tests to
measure the deviation of each node from the expected regular behavior. Each of these tests corresponds to a speciﬁc
misbehavior technique (e.g., backoff manipulation, reducing DIFS value and jamming CTS frames). The output of
these tests is analyzed by the decision component to infer
whether a given node is well behaved or greedy. A node is
considered as greedy if its corresponding deviation counter
286
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exceeds a predeﬁned threshold for at least one test. The
network administrator is then informed about the detected
cheaters in order to punish them adequately.
DOMINO fails to detect an adaptive greedy node which
alternates randomly among several misbehavior techniques
in order to escape from the detection engine; however, it still
achieving a higher bandwidth. To circumvent this weakness
of DOMINO, Reference [8] proposes a novel countermeasure based on fuzzy logic dubbed FLSAC. The main idea
of this scheme is to carry out a global estimation of node’s
deviation from the standard whenever this node is deemed
as well behaved by DOMINO (i.e., double check). The aim
of this veriﬁcation is to check whether the combined deviations of a node with respect to the misbehavior techniques
discussed earlier allow it to earn a considerable extra bandwidth. If so, this node is deemed as greedy and the same
reaction as in DOMINO is applied.
The main advantages of those solutions is that the punishment of the detected cheaters is ensured by a trustworthy
entity which is the AP. Furthermore, the task of disseminating the identity of the detected node is no longer needed.
3.2. Wireless multi-hop networks
environment
The sequential analysis concept introduced by Wald in
Reference [9] was widely used by researchers to struggle
security attacks in wireless networks. The scheme presented
in Reference [10] is based on this concept; it describes an
analytical model for the packets inter-arrival time distribution in saturated networks, representing an extension of
Bianchi ’s stochastic model [11]. Based on this model the
authors have developed an algorithm to detect the cheating nodes by observing the throughput earned by each
node. These observations are further evaluated through a
sequential probability ratio test to identify which node is
not obeying the protocol rules. To ensure its correctness,
this scheme assumes the knowledge of the exact value of
the greedy factor (i.e., the interval from which the greedy
node selects its back off value); however, this information
is not available in practice. Therefore this scheme cannot
work in real environment.
In Reference [12], a statistical framework is developed
in order to detect selﬁsh nodes which deliberately modify their contention window to increase their throughput.
First, a sample of number of idle slots between successful
transmissions of each node is collected. Subsequently, the
Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K-S) [13] test is applied to distinguish the misbehaving nodes (using unpredictable strategy)
from the legitimate ones. Notice that two detectors have
been proposed by the authors, a batch detector based on
Neyman–Pearson test and q sequential detector based on
Wald’s test. The results have shown that both of the detectors successfully identify the cheaters for the majority of
the applied strategies.
In order to guarantee a faster detection of the cheaters, the
authors of Reference [14] have developed the Predictable
Random Backoff (PRB) algorithm. PRB is based on slight
Security Comm. Networks 2011; 4:284–298 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec

S. Djahel, F. Naı̈t-abdesselam and D. Turgut

Characterizing the greedy behavior in wireless ad hoc networks

modiﬁcation of the standard backoff algorithm by forcing
each node to choose its backoff value from the interval
[CWlb , CW] instead of [0, CW], where CWlb is calculated
based on the previous backoff value and CW is a function
of CWmin along with the number of failed transmissions. In
this way, a receiver node can detect any deviation from the
sender since the backoff value is predictable. This solution
is faster than the previous ones; however, it presents the
following drawbacks:

 The backoff value observed by the receiver may be
different from the one generated by the sender due to
hidden terminal phenomenon, interference and inter
frame delay of TCP trafﬁc. Hence per frame detection
may increase the probability of triggering false alarms
and consequently punishing honest nodes.
 Since in PRB each node selects its backoff from a
smaller interval as compared to the Binary Exponential Back off (BEB) algorithm, the number of collisions
increases, leading to higher packet delay and low channel utilization.
Game theory has been widely applied for investigating
and assessing the selﬁsh behavior impact in CSMA/CA,
and numerous contributions have been proposed to cope
up with. In Reference [15], the authors have proven that
a selﬁsh and uncooperative behavior of a small number of
attackers results in harmful damage to the network. To prevent such situation, they have proposed a dynamic game
based scheme and derived the conditions which lead the set
of cheaters to reach the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, they have also proposed a detection mechanism for non cooperative cheaters along with an adequate
punishment scheme.
The common disadvantages of the herein described solutions is that none of them provides an efﬁcient reaction
scheme upon correct identiﬁcation of a greedy node. Furthermore, the revelation of the greedy node’s identity to the
whole set of well-behaved nodes remains an open issue.

Figure 2. Greedy behavior: WLAN versus MANETs.

ﬂow f2 is similar to the case of the ﬂow f3 in MANETs,
any attempt of the ﬂow’s source node A or an intermediate node B to dominate the medium deprives its next
hop from forwarding the received packets. Consequently,
the ﬂow’s performance collapses sharply. Furthermore, the
impact of this misbehavior may propagate to affect other
ﬂows crossing through the nodes in contention with the
greedy node.
To illustrate this phenomenon related to radio wave propagation, let us consider the network topology given in Figure
3. In this ﬁgure, Rtx and Rcs represent the transmission and
carrier sensing ranges of node A, respectively. The lightly
shaded area represents the region which is not covered by
RTS/CTS handshake between A and B. Note that any transmission initiated from a node within this region may not
interfere with packet reception at node B as these nodes are
out of its interference area, represented by the darker region
which is delimited by the interference range RI . Despite
that, the nodes within the lightly shaded area have to differ
their transmissions since they sense the medium busy due
to node A’s transmission. As a result, if the sender node A
misbehaves and monopolizes the medium for a long duration, all the transmissions over the links where at least one
node is within the lightly shaded area are delayed leading to
an increase on the number of dropped packets and the endto-end delay. Even the links (B,C) and (C,D) are negatively

4. GREEDY BEHAVIOR IMPACT ON
NETWORK PERFORMANCE: WLAN
VERSUS MANETS
In this section we emphasize the major difference between
the greedy behavior in WLAN and MANETs. In other
words, we try to answer the following question: Are the
damages induced by greedy nodes in WLAN and MANETs
similar?
As illustrated in Figure 2, the destination of a ﬂow in
WLAN can be either a far away node or the one attached
to the same AP. In the former case, the source node of the
ﬂow f1 tries to gain the entire bandwidth regardless of the
decrease in its neighbor’s throughput. This is due to the fact
that its next hop (AP) forwards the packets of the ﬂow f1
through a wired link, independent from the wireless ones
(no transmission conﬂict exist between those links). The
Security Comm. Networks 2011; 4:284–298 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec

Figure 3. Propagation of greedy behavior’s impact in MANETs.
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(greedy) then the end-to-end delay (Edi ) is computed as
x


Edi = 2Tpi +

(Tpj + CTj )

j=i+1

+

i−1


(Tpj + CTj ) + T1

(1)

j=1

where Tpi denotes the one hop transmission time of the
packet pi, CTj refers to the contention time spent by the
node before accessing the medium and T1 is the period during which the node is differing as one of its neighbors is
transmitting. In the case where the ﬂow’s source node is
behaving correctly the end-to-end delay Edi is expressed
as
Figure 4. The connectivity graph.

affected, which means that the greedy node A is increasing its throughput in the detriment of the quality of service
requirements of its own trafﬁc ﬂow.
On the contrary of MANETs, the situation discussed
above does not arise in WLAN environment since all the
nodes are within the transmission range of the AP, therefore
the increase of the greedy node’s throughput does not affect
the end-to-end delay of its trafﬁc ﬂow. As a conclusion, for
a more effective greedy behavior the greedy node should
choose an alternative strategy adapted to the constraints of
MANETs environment.
Illustrative example the Figure 5 shows an example of the
medium access frequency by a greedy node sending a trafﬁc
ﬂow, its next hop node and the other neighbors in case where
this greedy node tries to dominate the wireless medium.
Therefore, this behavior leads to starving the greedy node’s
neighbors, including its next hop node, from retransmitting the received packets. If we consider the simple case
where the destination node is two hops away from the sender

Edi = 2Tpi +

i−1


(Tpj + CTj ) + T1

(2)

j=1

then
Edi − Edi =

x


(Tpj + CTj )

(3)

j=i+1

This extra delay (Edi - Edi ) increases sharply as the number of packets (x) to be transmitted by the greedy node
gets higher, leading to devastating impact on the trafﬁc ﬂow
performance and violates all the QoS requirements.

5. DESIGNING NEW GREEDY
STRATEGY FOR MANETs
In this section, we give the road map of the required steps
for the greedy node to launch the greedy attack according

Figure 5. Example of bandwidth share among the greedy node, its next hop and the other neighbors nodes in the case where this
greedy node is applying full greedy strategy (similar to WLAN case) in order to monopolize the medium.
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to our strategy. First, we provide the basic assumptions of
our scheme followed by a description of how the greedy
node constructs the conﬂict graph. Next, we show how to
extract the bandwidth fair share of a node according to
the conﬂict graph. Afterwards, we determine the maximum
extra bandwidth that the greedy node can gain without negatively affecting its trafﬁc ﬂow performance. Finally, we
present the algorithm used by the greedy node to launch the
greedy attack and to ensure the accordance with the values
computed in the previous step.

whereas Hl denotes the aggregate length of Physical,
MAC and UDP headers deﬁned as follows:
Hl =

PHS + MHS + UHS
β

(6)

where PHS, MHS and UHS are the size of PHY, MAC
and UDP headers, respectively.

5.1. Main assumptions

5.2. Conflict graph construction

We give an overview of the assumptions used throughout the
paper. These assumptions constitute the core of our cheating
strategy.

As a ﬁrst step of our scheme, the greedy node constructs the
contention ﬂow graph with nodes within its Rcs to derive
its predicted fair-share of bandwidth [20]. To this end, the
greedy node analyzes the received information in Hello and
topology control (TC) messages and constructs its conﬂict
graph [21] accordingly. For example, node G in the topology
shown in Figure 4 acquires the set of its 2-hops neighbors A,
C, E, and F from the Hello messages sent by nodes B and D,
and it discovers its 3-hops neighbor H from the TC message
sent by the node F which is multipoint Relay (MPR) of node
H.
After acquiring the necessary information, the greedy
node G constructs the conﬂict graph within its carrier sensing range, from which it extracts the set of maximal cliques.
Since the topology information acquired from Hello and TC
messages is partial, node G constructs this graph by considering the worst case scenario assuming the maximum
number of contending links to compute the minimum bandwidth fair share. The number of maximal cliques is the key
for determining the misbehaving threshold which will be
discussed later. As shown in Figure 6, the conﬂict graph
depends on the extent of the carrier sensing range of the
greedy node, for which we distinguish two cases:

 A proactive routing protocol is used at the network layer to establish end-to-end routes such as
OLSR† [16].
 Carrier sensing range (Rcs ) is equal to more than twice
of the transmission range (Rtx ) [17], whereas the signal propagation follows the 2-Ray Ground Reﬂection
Model‡ [18].
 The nodes are distributed within the topology according to the Poisson process of parameter λ [19].
 We assume CBR trafﬁc with ﬁxed packets size S and
the transmission rate offered by the underlying MAC
protocol is β. Therefore, the number of time slots (η)
needed for the transmission of the packet payload is:

S
γ=

β

η

(4)

 The length of a packet Pl is deﬁned as the number of
time slots required for its successful transmission and
can be expressed as follows:
Pl =

(NAV − TDATA ) + DIFS + Hl
+γ
η

Pl =

Duration + DIFS + Hl
+γ
η

(5)

 Rcs is slightly larger than the transmission range Rtx

(see Figure 4, Rcs = Rcs1 ), thus we have less contention between links and consequently the greedy
behavior impact reduces. According to the set of maximal cliques shown in Figure 7(a), only a simultaneous

where
Duration = TRTS + TCTS + TACK + 3 × SIFS
Notice that TRTS , TCTS and TACK refer to the transmission time of RTS, CTS and ACK frames, respectively,

† Notice that we can use any other routing protocol which provides the
same topology view as OLSR.
‡ The two-ray ground model is a common propagation model that has
been widely used in wireless communications. Applying different propagation models could change the result, but the change is expected to
be subtle.

Security Comm. Networks 2011; 4:284–298 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec

Figure 6. Conﬂict graph of the contending transmissions: (a) case
of Rcs = Rcs1 and (b) case of Rcs = Rcs2 .
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node has a nonempty buffer of packets ready to be transmitted at each time slot (saturation case). Hence, given a
particular path relaying source and destination nodes, the
end-to-end throughput capacity is deﬁned as the minimum
link throughput capacity Bi of this path. As the links in conﬂict with the link 4 (G → D) are the bottleneck for any ﬂow
crossing them when G is cheating, we determine the end-toend throughput Eth as the minimum capacity of these links.
This means if the length of any path from the source node
to destination node is n hops, the end-to-end throughput is
computed only for the m hops (m ≤ n) within the sensing
range of the source node, which can be formulated as
2

Bi = sct × (1 − τ)λπRcs −1 × β ×
Eth = min(B1 , . . . ., BλπR2cs )

Figure 7. The set of maximal cliques: (a) Rcs = Rcs1 , 3 maximal
cliques whose sizes are 4, 4 and 5, respectively, and (b) Rcs =
Rcs2 , 2 maximal cliques of 6 vertices each. Note that the dashed
edges represent the new links created due to increase in Rcs
from Rcs1 to Rcs2 .

transmission over the following pair of links is allowed:

γ
Pl

(7)
(8)

where sct denotes the duration of successful and collided
transmissions of node i and τ is the probability of transmission. For more details on the computation of these values,
the reader may refer to the work by Wang and Garcia-LunaAceves [23].
Since we construct a partial topology graph limited to
links in which at least one of the extremity is within the
carrier sensing range of node G, then the calculated fairshare Bi of a node i might be greater than the real one Ri .
That is the reason why Ri can be expressed in function of
Bi as

(1, 5)

(3, 5)

(2, 7)

(1, 6)

(3, 6)

(2, 8)

(1, 7)

(3, 7)

(1, 8)

(3, 8)

such that  is a factor used to adjust the estimated fair-share
to the real one, where

 Rcs is greater than twice of the transmission range,

0.5 ≤  ≤ 1

Rcs > 2 × Rtx (see Figure 4, Rcs = Rcs2 ) which means
that all the 2-hops neighbors of the greedy node G are
within its carrier sensing range. Hence, only few links
can be active for ﬂow transmission at the same time as
depicted in Figure 7(b), where only the pairs of links
(1, 7), (1, 8), (3, 7), and (3, 8) are allowed to transport
trafﬁc ﬂows simultaneously. As compared to the ﬁrst
case, the number of conﬂict between links raises leading to devastating consequences if one node doesn’t
obey the MAC protocol rules.

Time complexity for generating the maximal cliques.
Given that for N nodes we have at most N(N−1)
links which
2
can be established between them. According to the algorithm by Tomita et al. [22], the worst-case time complexity
for generating the set of maximal cliques from the graph
constructed by those links is estimated to O(3N/3 ).
5.3. Bandwidth fair-share estimation
Once the conﬂict graph is established and the set of maximal cliques is derived, the node G computes its fair share
of bandwidth and the end-to-end throughput of its trafﬁc
ﬂow. In order to compute these values, we assume each
290

Ri = B i ×  × 

(9)

Moreover, as the greedy node constructs the topology
graph by considering the maximum number of links relaying its 2-hops neighbors and between these nodes and its
three hops neighbors, the computation of the fair-share is
done based on links which might not exist. For that reason,
the value , dubbed density factor, is used to increase this
fair-share accordingly. This value is determined upon the
following criterions:

 Nodes’ density in the neighborhood of the greedy node.
 The number of MPR nodes selected by the greedy
node; if this number is small and the density of nodes
within its carrier sensing range is high then it is more
likely to have more links between nodes, and consequently  can be assigned a value close to 1. On the
other hand, if the MPR set is large and the nodes’ density is mediocre then the value of  can be increased
more than the previous case.
The value  is expressed as
 =1+

|MPR set|
|S1 ∪ S2 |

(10)
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where S1 and S2 denote the sets of node G’s 1-hop and
2-hops neighbors, respectively.
Remark. In our proposed strategy, one may argue that a
node can request its one or 2-hops neighbors for exchanging
topology information in order to get the complete view of
the network. However, such an action makes the node suspicious which may facilitate its detection if any anti MAC
layer misbehavior system is deployed. Moreover, none of its
neighbors will respond to these requests since they are not
considered as proper operations of the routing protocols. As
a consequence, our proposed algorithm is more secure and
realistic since it depends only on the information gathered
locally by the greedy node from the legitimate exchange of
control packets.

of the bottleneck area (the area covered by Rcs ) and the
contention ﬂow graph. It can be expressed as
N


α=

MCi

i=1

N × cl

(12)

where MCi denotes the number of maximal cliques to whom
the link i ↔ j belongs such that the node i is either sender
or receiver over this link, and cl is the total number of the
maximal cliques in the conﬂict graph.

5.4. Misbehaving threshold computation

5.5. Launching the rational greedy strategy

In this section, we deﬁne an upper bound of the extra
bandwidth earned by the greedy node, dubbed misbehaving threshold. Any greedy node overtaking this threshold
will experience a decrease of its own ﬂows’ performance
(in terms of end-to-end throughput and delay).
As known, in the case where fair-share is held amongst
the contending nodes, the greedy node gets Ri of bandwidth.
When the greedy node misbehaves, its share is Ri + Bg
which means that it acquires Bg of extra bandwidth share
as a result of its mischief. So, for a rational greedy node,
the value Bg should satisfy the following condition

Once all the parameters deﬁned in the previous steps are
computed, the greedy node G carries out the two misbehavior techniques, described below, to achieve its goal.
It ﬁrst selects a small Backoff value in order to gain more
bandwidth within its allowed threshold. Then, it provokes
collisions with its neighbors’ frames except the frames of
its ongoing ﬂow’s next hop, by simply scheduling a transmission of a small or empty packet whenever it receives an
RTS which is not destined to it and not sent by its next hop
node. This process is illustrated by the Algorithm 1.

[B − (Ri + Bg )]
> α × Eth
(N − 1)

Algorithm 1: Greedy node behavior

(B − Ri − Bg ) > (N − 1)α × Eth

therefore
Bg ≤ B − Ri − (N − 1)α × Eth

(11)

such that, N is the average number of nodes within the carrier sensing range, Rcs , of the greedy node, which can be
expressed as N = λπR2cs . B is the total bandwidth available and Eth is the estimated end-to-end throughput of the
ongoing ﬂow calculated according to the formula given in
Equation (8).
The reason of using the condition above is the fact that
any adopted misbehaving strategy which reduces the mean§
of the greedy node neighbors’ throughput below the value
of Eth has also a negative impact on its own ﬂow’s performance. Hence, the rational greedy node has to ensure that
Bg fulﬁlls the condition given in Equation (11) in order to
satisfy the QoS requirements of its ﬂow.
Notice that the value α is used to adjust the extra bandwidth gain of the greedy node with respect to the topology
§ We use the mean of throughput of the greedy node’s neighbors as there
is a common bandwidth fair-share for each of them.
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if (RTS received) then
attempt = false; ;
if (@Dest == my address) then
schedule CTS transmission; ;
else
if ( @source ∈
/ NH-set ) then
if (+ + CPT < n1 ) then
schedule transmission of empty or
small packet after SIFS; ;
end
CPT = CPT mod n2 ; ;
else
attempt = true; ;
end
end
end
/*where NH-set is the set of the greedy node’s next hops for all
the ﬂows. n1 , n2 and CPT are values used to adjust the jamming
rate such that n1 < n2 . */

These two steps needs to be adjusted according to the
misbehaving threshold, Bg , which means that the greedy
node must compute the bandwidth share acquired by its next
hop and adjusts its jamming rate and contention window
accordingly. This process is described in Algorithm 2. In
this algorithm, the estimation of the next hop’s bandwidth is
periodically computed whenever the timer period is expired.
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Algorithm 2: Next hop bandwidth estimation and
adjustment of the cheating parameters accordingly
if ((DATA received) && (attempt == true)) then
BNH = BNH + Pl ; ;
if (Period elapsed) then
if (BNH < Eth ) then
increase jam rate; ;
if (Bown > Rshare +Bg ) then
decrease k;;
end
else
if ((Eth -BNH ) > threshold) then
decrease jam rate;;
end
end
BNH = 0;;
Bown = 0;;
end
end

S. Djahel, F. Naı̈t-abdesselam and D. Turgut

of jamming one CTS packet is given as follows:
costjam = mjam × sizejam + b
+



(costrecv + costdisc )

(14)

|S1 |

/*BNH and Bown are the bandwidth gained by the next hop and
the greedy nodes, respectively. They are expressed in terms of
number of time slots, during each period. The value Threshold is
used by the greedy node to prevent wasting more energy in
jamming whenever its goal is achieved. k is the misbehavior
coefﬁcient used to choose a small backoff value as described in
section 2. */

where costrecv and costdisc reﬂect the cost of the reception of the small packet sent by the greedy node and its
destruction by its neighbors, respectively. This emphasizes the importance of the proposed strategy in terms
of minimizing the jamming rate (i.e., jams only if necessary) in order to provide a QoS guarantee for the running
application.
To evaluate the amount of energy wasted for running our
scheme, let’s assume that during 1 s of network lifetime X
RTS frames have been successfully sent and the greedy node
has provoked collisions with X × jam rate CTS frames,
where 0 ≤ jam rate < 1. Therefore, the overall energy
Eoverall consumed by the greedy node for jamming others’
frames during the network lifetime T can be expressed as
Eoverall = T × X × jam rate × costjam1

(15)

where
costjam1 = costjam −

6. ENERGY CONSTRAINTS

(13)

such that the linear coefﬁcients m and b represent an incremental cost proportional to the packet size and the cost of
medium acquisition, respectively. In our strategy, the cost
292

(costrecv + costdisc )

|S1 |

The mobile nodes in ad hoc networks usually need to be
autonomous and independent from any central ﬁxed infrastructure, and thus powered by batteries providing limited
energy supply. In order to establish routes toward far away
destinations, each node have to participate in a distributed
routing protocol by exchanging broadcast/unicast control
packets, leading it to spend more energy. Since our proposed
greedy strategy is based on a proactive routing protocol,
known by its heavy control trafﬁc, so an important part
of the energy is consumed in sending and receiving this
trafﬁc. Therefore, for energy awareness perspectives, the
greedy node needs to minimize the energy wasted in jamming the frames sent in its neighborhood, otherwise its
energy depletes rapidly. In order to minimize the consumed
energy, a periodic tuning of the jamming rate is applied as
described in the Algorithm 2. This algorithm shows that the
greedy node jams its neighbors’ CTS frames at a minimum
rate in order to allow its next hop of the ongoing ﬂow to
achieve the appropriate throughput.
According to the study done in Reference [24], the energy
consumed by the network interface for sending, receiving
or discarding a packet is expressed as a linear equation:
cost = m × size + b



7. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
We now proceed to the experimental evaluation of our
proposed greedy strategy. First, we illustrate the propagation of the greedy behavior’s impact in ad hoc networks.
Then, we emphasize the beneﬁts gained by the greedy
node in terms of throughput, end-to-end delay, and delivery ratio of its trafﬁc ﬂow when it behaves according to
our strategy. The simulation parameters are summarized in
Table I.
Table I. Simulation settings.
Parameters

Values

Area
Physical layer
Transmission range
Carrier sensing range
Trafﬁc type
Data rate
CBR packets size
Buffer size
Simulation time
No. of simulation epochs
Network simulator

2000 m × 1000 m
direct sequence
250 m
550 m
CBR
2 mbps
500 bytes
64 packets
300 s
5
OPNET 14.0 [25]
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Figure 8. Propagation of greedy behavior’s impact according to CWm variation in MANETs, measured in terms of the acquired
throughput.

7.1. Propagation of greedy behavior impact
In our experiments, we consider the same topology shown
in Figure 4 where two trafﬁc ﬂows are generated, G → A
and F → H. The trafﬁc sources send 1000 bytes every 2 ms
(500 packets/s each), which means that each source node
has a packet ready for transmission at each time slot. Figure
8 plots the obtained throughput by the greedy node G, its
next hop node B and the node F with different values of

the contention window of node G. When node G behaves
correctly or sets its contention window constantly to 31
(equivalent to the minimum contention window CWm ), node
F gets more bandwidth since it has less contention than node
G. As we can see from the network topology, the location of
node F favors it to seize the channel more likely than nodes G
and B, leading to short term unfairness as well as long term
unfairness. For example, during node B’s transmission node
F monopolizes the channel by transmitting continuously

Figure 9. End-to-end delay of the greedy node’s ﬂow versus CWm size.
Security Comm. Networks 2011; 4:284–298 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Figure 10. Variation of the packet delivery ratio of the greedy node’s ﬂow versus the chosen CWm value.

over the link 8 (all links in conﬂict with this link are inactive)
and then increases its chance to transmit before node G
which is deferring due to node B’s transmission.
The throughput earned by the node F decreases slightly
with the decrease of node G’s contention window, whereas
the throughput of nodes G and B is increasing, until it collapses sharply when node G’s contention window is set to 1.
When node G monopolizes the medium by choosing constantly a backoff value equal to 0, CWm = 1, the throughput
of its next hop, node B, drops sharply and consequently the
delivery ratio of the ﬂow G → A drops as well (see Figure
10.)
From Figures 8–10, we note that the misbehavior of the
node G has a devastating impact only when it constantly
sets its CWm to 1, where the end-to-end delay for the small
portion of packets forwarded by node B becomes quite
long leading to violation of the running application’s QoS
requirements. Moreover, this impact propagates to affect
any other trafﬁc ﬂow within node G’s carrier sensing range
which makes this area a bottleneck in the network.

to the results shown in Figure 12, we can see that when the
node G tries to monopolize the medium for its own trafﬁc (Full-greedy), its throughput gain is more than twice of
the one earned in the W-behaved case and the bandwidth
gained by its next hop node B is decreased to less than half.
Consequently, the end-to-end delay of the ﬂow f1 is doubled along with the collapse of the packet delivery ratio as
depicted in Table II. Hence, as opposed to WLAN the Fullgreedy strategy is inadequate in MANETs since it affects the
performance of the trafﬁc ﬂow initiated by the greedy node
itself.
As alternative strategies, we have implemented Semigreedy1 and Semi-greedy2 in which the node G constantly

7.2. Advantages of the proposed greedy
behavior strategy
In this section, we highlight the advantage of adopting our
strategy by the greedy node. We consider the topology
shown in Figure 11, where four trafﬁc ﬂows f1 , f2 , f3 , and
f4 are generated in the network such that each source node
sends 200 packets per second of 500 bytes each. In this
scenario, we vary the node G’s behavior among different
strategies and observe the impact of each on the throughput,
end-to-end delay and the packet delivery ratio. According
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Figure 11. Topology used for evaluation of our proposed greedy
behavior strategy.
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Figure 12. Variation of the trafﬁc ﬂows sources’ throughput with the different cheating strategies adopted by the greedy node G.
Table II. End-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio of ﬂow f1 under various greedy behavior strategies.

W-behaved
End-to-end delay (seconds)
Delivery ratio (%)

0.679
79.11

Full-greedy

Semi-greedy1

Semi-greedy2

CWm = 1

CWm = 31,
jam rate = 0.5

CWm = 16,
jam rate = 0.2

1.4295
15.95

0.554
76.59

sets its CWm to 31 and 16, its jam-rate to 0.5 and 0.2, respectively. The results show that in the former strategy node G
successfully increases its own throughput and the one of its
next hop compared to the W-behaved strategy whereas the
throughput of all its neighbors decreases to less than half.
The drawback of this strategy is the energy necessary to jam
50% of CTS packets sent by its 2-hops neighbors. Hence,
due to the limited energy supply in MANETs, this strategy is
unsuitable for adoption by the node G. For the latter strategy, node B’s throughput is increased considerably along
with the delivery ratio compared to the Full-greedy strategy; however, the rapidly changing topology of MANETs
makes it inefﬁcient since the chosen jam-rate and CWm
Table III. Scenarios setting.
Scenario
1
2
3
4
5

Network density (DN )
−6

5.0× 10
1.5 × 10−5
2.5 × 10−5
3.5 × 10−5
5.0× 10−5

#ﬂows
5
10
15
15
15
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1.1388
46.04

Rational1

Rational2

0.859
50.59

0.985
45.93

may not produce the same results in different network
topologies.
Based on our discussion above, the main issues for choosing a suitable greedy strategy in MANETs are the energy
constraints and the rapidly changing topology. To circumvent the limitations of the previous strategies regarding
these issues, we apply our proposed method where we have
implemented two scenarios Rational1 and Rational2. In
Rational1, the greedy node G constructs the conﬂict graph
according to the information acquired from HELLO and
TC messages (i.e., the best case in terms of the obtained
throughput), whereas in Rational2 it assumes the maximum number of contention among the links (i.e., the worst
case for the estimated throughput). As shown in Figure 12
and Table II, both scenarios give good results in terms of
end-to-end delay and packet delivery ratio as compared
to Full-greedy strategy, with a considerable increase of
throughput where node B’s throughput is almost equal to
the one acquired in W-behaved strategy. Moreover, in both
scenarios the greedy node G still gains more bandwidth than
its neighbors and maintains a reasonable performance of its
ﬂow f1 . Therefore, these results prove the efﬁciency of our
greedy strategy in MANETs.
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ﬁve random network topologies consisting of 10, 30,
50, 70, and 100 nodes, respectively. A number of trafﬁc ﬂows are also generated in the network such that
each source node sends 100 packets per second of 500
bytes each. Some of these ﬂows are generated by the
greedy node and forwarded either through one or multiple
neighbors.
In these scenarios the nodes move randomly within the
area and their velocities vary from 0 m/s to 20 m/s. The network density (DN ) is estimated according to the following
formula

DN =
Figure 13. The topology perceived by the node G in the worst
case, where the dashed lines denotes the extra links which are
not acquired from Hello and TC message.

Figure 14. Multiple trafﬁc ﬂows issued from the greedy node G
and forwarded either through one or several next hops.

(16)

where area is the network area in m2 and N is the number
of nodes in the network.
The different values of the network density and the
number of trafﬁc ﬂows generated in each scenario are summarized on the Table III.
We deﬁne the effectiveness factor ( ) in order to measure the efﬁciency of our greedy strategy with the variation
of the following metrics: nodes speed, network density
and the number of ﬂows. This factor can be expressed as
follows;

7.3. Impact of the mobility and network
density on the efficiency of our greedy
strategy
In order to assess the efﬁciency of our greedy strategy in dense and highly mobile network, we generate

N
area

thng +
=





|NH−set|
(i=1)

2

N1−(|NH−set|+1)

thni
−

thni

(i=1)

N1 − (|NH − set| + 1)

(17)

Figure 15. Variation of the effectiveness factor in different scenarios: case of greedy node sending multiple ﬂows through only one
next hop node.
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Figure 16. Variation of the effectiveness factor in different scenarios: case of greedy node sending multiple ﬂows through several
next hops.

such that thng and thni are the throughput of the greedy node
and its next hop nodes, respectively. N1 refers to the number of nodes within the sensing range of the greedy node
which are generating trafﬁc ﬂows or forwarding data packets and |NH − set| is the number of next hops of the greedy
node.
As we can see from the curves plotted in Figure 15,
the effectiveness factor reduces with the increase of nodes
mobility and network density as well as the number of competing ﬂows in the network. Moreover, it is observed that
decreases more in scenarios 4 and 5 where the nodes’ speed
are 15 m/s and 20 m/s, respectively. Despite that our scheme
is still effective since the worst value of is 8 packets/s.
As expected, our greedy strategy fails if the greedy node
is sending multiple ﬂows simultaneously through several
next hops nodes as depicted in Figure 14, hence even if the
greedy node jams the other neighbors’ frames its next hops’
nodes have to compete with each others to gain access to the
medium. Therefore, reduces as the number of ﬂows initiated or forwarded by the greedy node through different next
hops’s nodes goes to higher. The results graphed in Figure
16 show that reduces sharply as compared to the results
plotted in Figure 15, in which all the ﬂows initiated from
the greedy node are forwarded through one node, because
the competition between the next hops nodes leads to a
large number of collisions which makes the task of applying
our scheme very difﬁcult. Moreover, the increasing velocities of nodes and network density participate also to the
failure of our scheme, especially in the scenario 5 where
the value of is equal to 0 when the velocity of nodes is
20 m/s.
Security Comm. Networks 2011; 4:284–298 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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8. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have analyzed the greedy behavior problem in wireless ad hoc networks and proven that its impact
can be more devastating compared to that in wireless local
area networks. The propagation of the effect of this misbehavior is illustrated through conﬂict graphs analysis. As
a result of this investigation, an effective greedy behavior
strategy is proposed, which is suitable for ad hoc networks.
This method allows the greedy node to gain more bandwidth
share compared to its neighbors and keeps the performance
of its ongoing ﬂows reasonable by maintaining its extra
bandwidth share within the misbehaving threshold. Our
algorithm is evaluated through extensive simulations and
the obtained results highlight its advantage in terms of the
increase in delivery ratio and the reduction of the end-toend delays compared to the Full-greedy strategy applied in
WLAN.
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